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11 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Dylan Conway
61c1ea8969 fix(shell): handle unrecognized errno in cd instead of hanging
When `cd` encounters an unrecognized errno (e.g. ENAMETOOLONG for path
components > 255 bytes), handleChangeCwdErr returned `.failed` which
means "JS error was thrown" but no error was actually thrown. This
caused the shell trampoline to terminate without completing the command,
hanging the shell indefinitely.

Now the else branch looks up a human-readable error message via
coreutils_error_map and writes it to stderr, matching the behavior
of the NOTDIR/NOENT cases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-13 02:47:11 +00:00
robobun
7a801fcf93 fix(ini): prevent OOB read and UB on truncated/invalid UTF-8 in INI parser (#26947)
## Summary

- Fix out-of-bounds read in the INI parser's `prepareStr` function when
a multi-byte UTF-8 lead byte appears at the end of a value with
insufficient continuation bytes
- Fix undefined behavior when bare continuation bytes (0x80-0xBF) cause
`utf8ByteSequenceLength` to return 0, hitting an `unreachable` branch
(UB in ReleaseFast builds)
- Add bounds checking before accessing `val[i+1]`, `val[i+2]`,
`val[i+3]` in both escaped and non-escaped code paths

The vulnerability could be triggered by a crafted `.npmrc` file
containing truncated UTF-8 sequences. In release builds, this could
cause OOB heap reads (potential info leak) or undefined behavior.

## Test plan

- [x] Added 9 tests covering truncated 2/3/4-byte sequences, bare
continuation bytes, and escaped contexts
- [x] All 52 INI parser tests pass (`bun bd test
test/js/bun/ini/ini.test.ts`)
- [x] No regressions in npmrc tests (failures are pre-existing Verdaccio
connectivity issues)

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Claude Bot <claude-bot@bun.sh>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-12 00:28:44 -08:00
robobun
44541eb574 fix(sql): reject null bytes in connection parameters to prevent protocol injection (#26952)
## Summary

- Reject null bytes in `username`, `password`, `database`, and `path`
connection parameters for both PostgreSQL and MySQL to prevent wire
protocol parameter injection
- Both the Postgres and MySQL wire protocols use null-terminated strings
in their startup/handshake messages, so embedded null bytes in these
fields act as field terminators, allowing injection of arbitrary
protocol parameters (e.g. `search_path` for schema hijacking)
- The fix validates these fields immediately after UTF-8 conversion and
throws `InvalidArguments` error with a clear message if null bytes are
found

## Test plan

- [x] New test
`test/regression/issue/postgres-null-byte-injection.test.ts` verifies:
- Null bytes in username are rejected with an error before any data is
sent
- Null bytes in database are rejected with an error before any data is
sent
- Null bytes in password are rejected with an error before any data is
sent
  - Normal connections without null bytes still work correctly
- [x] Test verified to fail with `USE_SYSTEM_BUN=1` (unfixed bun) and
pass with `bun bd test` (fixed build)
- [x] Existing SQL tests pass (`adapter-env-var-precedence.test.ts`,
`postgres-stringbuilder-assertion-aggressive.test.ts`)

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Bot <claude-bot@bun.sh>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-12 00:27:00 -08:00
robobun
993be3f931 fix(plugin): set virtualModules to nullptr after delete in clearAll (#26940)
## Summary

- Fix double-free in `Bun.plugin.clearAll()` by setting `virtualModules
= nullptr` after `delete`
- In `jsFunctionBunPluginClear` (`BunPlugin.cpp:956`), `delete
global->onLoadPlugins.virtualModules` freed the pointer without
nullifying it. When the `OnLoad` destructor later runs (during Worker
termination or VM destruction), it checks `if (virtualModules)` — the
dangling non-null pointer passes the check and is deleted again,
corrupting the heap allocator.

## Test plan

- [ ] New test
`test/regression/issue/plugin-clearall-double-free.test.ts` spawns a
subprocess that registers a virtual module, calls
`Bun.plugin.clearAll()`, and exits with `BUN_DESTRUCT_VM_ON_EXIT=1` to
trigger the destructor path
- [ ] Verified the test fails on the system bun (pre-fix) with `pas
panic: deallocation did fail ... Alloc bit not set`
- [ ] Verified the test passes with the debug build (post-fix)
- [ ] Existing plugin tests (`test/js/bun/plugin/plugins.test.ts`) all
pass (29/29)

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Bot <claude-bot@bun.sh>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Jarred Sumner <jarred@jarredsumner.com>
2026-02-11 23:14:43 -08:00
robobun
a68393926b fix(ws): handle fragmented pong frames and validate control frame size (#26944)
## Summary

- Fix WebSocket client pong frame handler to properly handle payloads
split across TCP segments, preventing frame desync that could cause
protocol confusion
- Add missing RFC 6455 Section 5.5 validation: control frame payloads
must not exceed 125 bytes (pong handler lacked this check, unlike ping
and close handlers)

## Details

The pong handler (lines 652-663) had two issues:

1. **Frame desync on fragmented delivery**: When a pong payload was
split across TCP segments (`data.len < receive_body_remain`), the
handler consumed only the available bytes but unconditionally reset
`receive_state = .need_header` and `receive_body_remain = 0`. The
remaining payload bytes in the next TCP delivery were then
misinterpreted as WebSocket frame headers.

2. **Missing payload length validation**: Unlike the ping handler (line
615) and close handler (line 680), the pong handler did not validate the
7-bit payload length against the RFC 6455 limit of 125 bytes for control
frames.

The fix models the pong handler after the existing ping handler pattern:
track partial delivery state with a `pong_received` boolean, buffer
incoming data into `ping_frame_bytes`, and only reset to `need_header`
after the complete payload has been consumed.

## Test plan

- [x] New test `websocket-pong-fragmented.test.ts` verifies:
- Fragmented pong delivery (50-byte payload split into 2+48 bytes) does
not cause frame desync, and a subsequent text frame is received
correctly
- Pong frames with >125 byte payloads are rejected as invalid control
frames
- [x] Test fails with `USE_SYSTEM_BUN=1` (reproduces the bug) and passes
with `bun bd test`
- [x] Existing WebSocket tests pass: `websocket-client.test.ts`,
`websocket-close-fragmented.test.ts`,
`websocket-client-short-read.test.ts`

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Claude Bot <claude-bot@bun.sh>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-11 23:12:28 -08:00
robobun
e8a5f23385 fix(s3): reject CRLF characters in header values to prevent header injection (#26942)
## Summary

- Fixes HTTP header injection vulnerability in S3 client where
user-controlled options (`contentDisposition`, `contentEncoding`,
`type`) were passed to HTTP headers without CRLF validation
- Adds input validation at the JS-to-Zig boundary in
`src/s3/credentials.zig` that throws a `TypeError` if `\r` or `\n`
characters are detected
- An attacker could previously inject arbitrary headers (e.g.
`X-Amz-Security-Token`) by embedding `\r\n` in these string fields

## Test plan

- [x] Added `test/regression/issue/s3-header-injection.test.ts` with 6
tests:
  - CRLF in `contentDisposition` throws
  - CRLF in `contentEncoding` throws
  - CRLF in `type` (content-type) throws
  - Lone CR in `contentDisposition` throws
  - Lone LF in `contentDisposition` throws
  - Valid `contentDisposition` without CRLF still works correctly
- [x] Tests fail with `USE_SYSTEM_BUN=1` (confirming vulnerability
exists in current release)
- [x] Tests pass with `bun bd test` (confirming fix works)

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Claude Bot <claude-bot@bun.sh>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-11 23:02:39 -08:00
robobun
16b3e7cde7 fix(libarchive): use normalized path in mkdiratZ to prevent directory traversal (#26956)
## Summary

- Fix path traversal vulnerability in tarball directory extraction on
POSIX systems where `mkdiratZ` used the un-normalized `pathname` (raw
from tarball) instead of the normalized `path` variable, allowing `../`
components to escape the extraction root via kernel path resolution
- The Windows directory creation, symlink creation, and file creation
code paths already correctly used the normalized path — only the two
POSIX `mkdiratZ` calls were affected (lines 463 and 469)
- `bun install` is not affected because npm mode skips directory
entries; affected callers include `bun create`, GitHub tarball
extraction, and `compile_target`

## Test plan

- [x] Added regression test that crafts a tarball with
`safe_dir/../../escaped_dir/` directory entry and verifies it cannot
create directories outside the extraction root
- [x] Verified test **fails** with system bun (vulnerable) and
**passes** with debug build (fixed)
- [x] Full `archive.test.ts` suite passes (99/99 tests)
- [x] `symlink-path-traversal.test.ts` continues to pass (3/3 tests)

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Claude Bot <claude-bot@bun.sh>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-11 22:47:41 -08:00
robobun
4c32f15339 fix(sql): use constant-time comparison for SCRAM server signature (#26937)
## Summary

- Replace `bun.strings.eqlLong` with BoringSSL's `CRYPTO_memcmp` for
SCRAM-SHA-256 server signature verification in the PostgreSQL client
- The previous comparison (`eqlLong`) returned early on the first
mismatching byte, potentially leaking information about the expected
server signature via timing side-channel
- `CRYPTO_memcmp` is already used elsewhere in the codebase for
constant-time comparisons (CSRF tokens, `crypto.timingSafeEqual`,
KeyObject comparison)

## Test plan

- [x] `bun bd` compiles successfully
- [ ] Existing SCRAM-SHA-256 integration tests in
`test/js/sql/sql.test.ts` pass (require Docker/PostgreSQL)

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Claude Bot <claude-bot@bun.sh>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-11 22:45:47 -08:00
robobun
635034ee33 fix(shell): use-after-free in runFromJS when setupIOBeforeRun fails (#26920)
## Summary

- Fixes #26918 — segfault at address `0x28189480080` caused by
use-after-free in the shell interpreter
- When `setupIOBeforeRun()` fails (e.g., stdout handle unavailable on
Windows), the `runFromJS` error path called `deinitFromExec()` which
directly freed the GC-managed interpreter object with
`allocator.destroy(this)`. When the GC later swept and called
`deinitFromFinalizer()` on the already-freed memory, it caused a
segfault.
- Replaced `deinitFromExec()` with `derefRootShellAndIOIfNeeded(true)`
which properly cleans up runtime resources (IO handles, shell
environment) while leaving final object destruction to the GC finalizer
— matching the pattern already used in `finish()`.

## Test plan

- [x] Added regression test in `test/regression/issue/26918.test.ts`
that verifies the shell interpreter handles closed stdout gracefully
without crashing
- [x] Test passes with `bun bd test test/regression/issue/26918.test.ts`
- [ ] The actual crash is primarily reproducible on Windows where stdout
handles can be truly unavailable — CI Windows tests should validate the
fix

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Bot <claude-bot@bun.sh>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Jarred Sumner <jarred@jarredsumner.com>
2026-02-11 17:51:10 -08:00
robobun
3e792d0d2e fix(test): write JUnit reporter outfile when --bail triggers early exit (#26852)
## Summary
- When `--bail` caused an early exit after a test failure, the JUnit
reporter output file (`--reporter-outfile`) was never written because
`Global.exit()` was called before the normal completion path
- Extracted the JUnit write logic into a `writeJUnitReportIfNeeded()`
method on `CommandLineReporter` and call it in both bail exit paths
(test failure and unhandled rejection) as well as the normal completion
path

Closes #26851

## Test plan
- [x] Added regression test `test/regression/issue/26851.test.ts` with
two cases:
  - Single failing test file with `--bail` produces JUnit XML output
- Multiple test files where bail triggers on second file still writes
the report
- [x] Verified test fails with system bun (`USE_SYSTEM_BUN=1`)
- [x] Verified test passes with `bun bd test`

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Bot <claude-bot@bun.sh>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-11 17:41:45 -08:00
robobun
b7d505b6c1 deflake: make HMR rapid edits test event-driven (#26890)
## Summary
- Add `expectMessageEventually(value)` to the bake test harness `Client`
class — waits for a specific message to appear, draining any
intermediate messages that arrived before it
- Rewrite "hmr handles rapid consecutive edits" test to use raw
`Bun.write` + sleep for intermediate edits and `expectMessageEventually`
for the final assertion, avoiding flaky failures when HMR batches
updates non-deterministically across platforms

Fixes flaky failure on Windows where an extra "render 10" message
arrived after `expectMessage` consumed its expected messages but before
client disposal.

## Test plan
- [x] `bun bd test test/bake/dev-and-prod.test.ts` — all 12 tests pass
- [x] Ran the specific test multiple times to confirm no flakiness

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Alistair Smith <alistair@anthropic.com>
2026-02-11 16:05:25 -08:00
18 changed files with 982 additions and 54 deletions

View File

@@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ BUN_DEFINE_HOST_FUNCTION(jsFunctionBunPluginClear, (JSC::JSGlobalObject * global
global->onResolvePlugins.namespaces.clear();
delete global->onLoadPlugins.virtualModules;
global->onLoadPlugins.virtualModules = nullptr;
return JSC::JSValue::encode(JSC::jsUndefined());
}

View File

@@ -948,6 +948,7 @@ pub const CommandLineReporter = struct {
this.printSummary();
Output.prettyError("\nBailed out after {d} failure{s}<r>\n", .{ this.jest.bail, if (this.jest.bail == 1) "" else "s" });
Output.flush();
this.writeJUnitReportIfNeeded();
Global.exit(1);
}
},
@@ -970,6 +971,20 @@ pub const CommandLineReporter = struct {
Output.printStartEnd(bun.start_time, std.time.nanoTimestamp());
}
/// Writes the JUnit reporter output file if a JUnit reporter is active and
/// an outfile path was configured. This must be called before any early exit
/// (e.g. bail) so that the report is not lost.
pub fn writeJUnitReportIfNeeded(this: *CommandLineReporter) void {
if (this.reporters.junit) |junit| {
if (this.jest.test_options.reporter_outfile) |outfile| {
if (junit.current_file.len > 0) {
junit.endTestSuite() catch {};
}
junit.writeToFile(outfile) catch {};
}
}
}
pub fn generateCodeCoverage(this: *CommandLineReporter, vm: *jsc.VirtualMachine, opts: *TestCommand.CodeCoverageOptions, comptime reporters: TestCommand.Reporters, comptime enable_ansi_colors: bool) !void {
if (comptime !reporters.text and !reporters.lcov) {
return;
@@ -1772,12 +1787,7 @@ pub const TestCommand = struct {
Output.prettyError("\n", .{});
Output.flush();
if (reporter.reporters.junit) |junit| {
if (junit.current_file.len > 0) {
junit.endTestSuite() catch {};
}
junit.writeToFile(ctx.test_options.reporter_outfile.?) catch {};
}
reporter.writeJUnitReportIfNeeded();
if (vm.hot_reload == .watch) {
vm.runWithAPILock(jsc.VirtualMachine, vm, runEventLoopForWatch);
@@ -1920,6 +1930,7 @@ pub const TestCommand = struct {
if (reporter.jest.bail == reporter.summary().fail) {
reporter.printSummary();
Output.prettyError("\nBailed out after {d} failure{s}<r>\n", .{ reporter.jest.bail, if (reporter.jest.bail == 1) "" else "s" });
reporter.writeJUnitReportIfNeeded();
vm.exit_handler.exit_code = 1;
vm.is_shutting_down = true;

View File

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ pub fn NewWebSocketClient(comptime ssl: bool) type {
ping_frame_bytes: [128 + 6]u8 = [_]u8{0} ** (128 + 6),
ping_len: u8 = 0,
ping_received: bool = false,
pong_received: bool = false,
close_received: bool = false,
close_frame_buffering: bool = false,
@@ -120,6 +121,7 @@ pub fn NewWebSocketClient(comptime ssl: bool) type {
this.clearReceiveBuffers(true);
this.clearSendBuffers(true);
this.ping_received = false;
this.pong_received = false;
this.ping_len = 0;
this.close_frame_buffering = false;
this.receive_pending_chunk_len = 0;
@@ -650,14 +652,38 @@ pub fn NewWebSocketClient(comptime ssl: bool) type {
if (data.len == 0) break;
},
.pong => {
const pong_len = @min(data.len, @min(receive_body_remain, this.ping_frame_bytes.len));
if (!this.pong_received) {
if (receive_body_remain > 125) {
this.terminate(ErrorCode.invalid_control_frame);
terminated = true;
break;
}
this.ping_len = @truncate(receive_body_remain);
receive_body_remain = 0;
this.pong_received = true;
}
const pong_len = this.ping_len;
this.dispatchData(data[0..pong_len], .Pong);
if (data.len > 0) {
const total_received = @min(pong_len, receive_body_remain + data.len);
const slice = this.ping_frame_bytes[6..][receive_body_remain..total_received];
@memcpy(slice, data[0..slice.len]);
receive_body_remain = total_received;
data = data[slice.len..];
}
const pending_body = pong_len - receive_body_remain;
if (pending_body > 0) {
// wait for more data - pong payload is fragmented across TCP segments
break;
}
const pong_data = this.ping_frame_bytes[6..][0..pong_len];
this.dispatchData(pong_data, .Pong);
data = data[pong_len..];
receive_state = .need_header;
receive_body_remain = 0;
receiving_type = last_receive_data_type;
this.pong_received = false;
if (data.len == 0) break;
},

View File

@@ -291,25 +291,32 @@ pub const Parser = struct {
}
},
else => {
try unesc.appendSlice(switch (bun.strings.utf8ByteSequenceLength(c)) {
1 => brk: {
break :brk &[_]u8{ '\\', c };
switch (bun.strings.utf8ByteSequenceLength(c)) {
0, 1 => try unesc.appendSlice(&[_]u8{ '\\', c }),
2 => if (val.len - i >= 2) {
try unesc.appendSlice(&[_]u8{ '\\', c, val[i + 1] });
i += 1;
} else {
try unesc.appendSlice(&[_]u8{ '\\', c });
},
2 => brk: {
defer i += 1;
break :brk &[_]u8{ '\\', c, val[i + 1] };
3 => if (val.len - i >= 3) {
try unesc.appendSlice(&[_]u8{ '\\', c, val[i + 1], val[i + 2] });
i += 2;
} else {
try unesc.append('\\');
try unesc.appendSlice(val[i..val.len]);
i = val.len - 1;
},
3 => brk: {
defer i += 2;
break :brk &[_]u8{ '\\', c, val[i + 1], val[i + 2] };
4 => if (val.len - i >= 4) {
try unesc.appendSlice(&[_]u8{ '\\', c, val[i + 1], val[i + 2], val[i + 3] });
i += 3;
} else {
try unesc.append('\\');
try unesc.appendSlice(val[i..val.len]);
i = val.len - 1;
},
4 => brk: {
defer i += 3;
break :brk &[_]u8{ '\\', c, val[i + 1], val[i + 2], val[i + 3] };
},
// this means invalid utf8
else => unreachable,
});
}
},
}
@@ -342,25 +349,30 @@ pub const Parser = struct {
try unesc.append('.');
}
},
else => try unesc.appendSlice(switch (bun.strings.utf8ByteSequenceLength(c)) {
1 => brk: {
break :brk &[_]u8{c};
else => switch (bun.strings.utf8ByteSequenceLength(c)) {
0, 1 => try unesc.append(c),
2 => if (val.len - i >= 2) {
try unesc.appendSlice(&[_]u8{ c, val[i + 1] });
i += 1;
} else {
try unesc.append(c);
},
2 => brk: {
defer i += 1;
break :brk &[_]u8{ c, val[i + 1] };
3 => if (val.len - i >= 3) {
try unesc.appendSlice(&[_]u8{ c, val[i + 1], val[i + 2] });
i += 2;
} else {
try unesc.appendSlice(val[i..val.len]);
i = val.len - 1;
},
3 => brk: {
defer i += 2;
break :brk &[_]u8{ c, val[i + 1], val[i + 2] };
4 => if (val.len - i >= 4) {
try unesc.appendSlice(&[_]u8{ c, val[i + 1], val[i + 2], val[i + 3] });
i += 3;
} else {
try unesc.appendSlice(val[i..val.len]);
i = val.len - 1;
},
4 => brk: {
defer i += 3;
break :brk &[_]u8{ c, val[i + 1], val[i + 2], val[i + 3] };
},
// this means invalid utf8
else => unreachable,
}),
},
}
}

View File

@@ -460,13 +460,13 @@ pub const Archiver = struct {
if (comptime Environment.isWindows) {
try bun.MakePath.makePath(u16, dir, path);
} else {
std.posix.mkdiratZ(dir_fd, pathname, @intCast(mode)) catch |err| {
std.posix.mkdiratZ(dir_fd, path, @intCast(mode)) catch |err| {
// It's possible for some tarballs to return a directory twice, with and
// without `./` in the beginning. So if it already exists, continue to the
// next entry.
if (err == error.PathAlreadyExists or err == error.NotDir) continue;
bun.makePath(dir, std.fs.path.dirname(path_slice) orelse return err) catch {};
std.posix.mkdiratZ(dir_fd, pathname, 0o777) catch {};
std.posix.mkdiratZ(dir_fd, path, 0o777) catch {};
};
}
},

View File

@@ -221,7 +221,11 @@ pub const S3Credentials = struct {
defer str.deref();
if (str.tag != .Empty and str.tag != .Dead) {
new_credentials._contentDispositionSlice = str.toUTF8(bun.default_allocator);
new_credentials.content_disposition = new_credentials._contentDispositionSlice.?.slice();
const slice = new_credentials._contentDispositionSlice.?.slice();
if (containsNewlineOrCR(slice)) {
return globalObject.throwInvalidArguments("contentDisposition must not contain newline characters (CR/LF)", .{});
}
new_credentials.content_disposition = slice;
}
} else {
return globalObject.throwInvalidArgumentTypeValue("contentDisposition", "string", js_value);
@@ -236,7 +240,11 @@ pub const S3Credentials = struct {
defer str.deref();
if (str.tag != .Empty and str.tag != .Dead) {
new_credentials._contentTypeSlice = str.toUTF8(bun.default_allocator);
new_credentials.content_type = new_credentials._contentTypeSlice.?.slice();
const slice = new_credentials._contentTypeSlice.?.slice();
if (containsNewlineOrCR(slice)) {
return globalObject.throwInvalidArguments("type must not contain newline characters (CR/LF)", .{});
}
new_credentials.content_type = slice;
}
} else {
return globalObject.throwInvalidArgumentTypeValue("type", "string", js_value);
@@ -251,7 +259,11 @@ pub const S3Credentials = struct {
defer str.deref();
if (str.tag != .Empty and str.tag != .Dead) {
new_credentials._contentEncodingSlice = str.toUTF8(bun.default_allocator);
new_credentials.content_encoding = new_credentials._contentEncodingSlice.?.slice();
const slice = new_credentials._contentEncodingSlice.?.slice();
if (containsNewlineOrCR(slice)) {
return globalObject.throwInvalidArguments("contentEncoding must not contain newline characters (CR/LF)", .{});
}
new_credentials.content_encoding = slice;
}
} else {
return globalObject.throwInvalidArgumentTypeValue("contentEncoding", "string", js_value);
@@ -1150,6 +1162,12 @@ const CanonicalRequest = struct {
}
};
/// Returns true if the given slice contains any CR (\r) or LF (\n) characters,
/// which would allow HTTP header injection if used in a header value.
fn containsNewlineOrCR(value: []const u8) bool {
return std.mem.indexOfAny(u8, value, "\r\n") != null;
}
const std = @import("std");
const ACL = @import("./acl.zig").ACL;
const MultiPartUploadOptions = @import("./multipart_options.zig").MultiPartUploadOptions;

View File

@@ -87,7 +87,16 @@ fn handleChangeCwdErr(this: *Cd, err: Syscall.Error, new_cwd_: []const u8) Yield
return this.writeStderrNonBlocking("not a directory: {s}\n", .{new_cwd_});
},
else => return .failed,
else => {
const message: []const u8 = brk: {
if (err.getErrorCodeTagName()) |entry| {
_, const sys_errno = entry;
if (Syscall.coreutils_error_map.get(sys_errno)) |msg| break :brk msg;
}
break :brk "unknown error";
};
return this.writeStderrNonBlocking("{s}: {s}\n", .{ new_cwd_, message });
},
}
}

View File

@@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ pub const Interpreter = struct {
_ = callframe; // autofix
if (this.setupIOBeforeRun().asErr()) |e| {
defer this.#deinitFromExec();
defer this.#derefRootShellAndIOIfNeeded(true);
const shellerr = bun.shell.ShellErr.newSys(e);
return try throwShellErr(&shellerr, .{ .js = globalThis.bunVM().event_loop });
}

View File

@@ -422,6 +422,19 @@ pub fn createInstance(globalObject: *jsc.JSGlobalObject, callframe: *jsc.CallFra
break :brk b.allocatedSlice();
};
// Reject null bytes in connection parameters to prevent protocol injection
// (null bytes act as field terminators in the MySQL wire protocol).
inline for (.{ .{ username, "username" }, .{ password, "password" }, .{ database, "database" }, .{ path, "path" } }) |entry| {
if (entry[0].len > 0 and std.mem.indexOfScalar(u8, entry[0], 0) != null) {
bun.default_allocator.free(options_buf);
tls_config.deinit();
if (tls_ctx) |tls| {
tls.deinit(true);
}
return globalObject.throwInvalidArguments(entry[1] ++ " must not contain null bytes", .{});
}
}
const on_connect = arguments[9];
const on_close = arguments[10];
const idle_timeout = arguments[11].toInt32();

View File

@@ -680,6 +680,20 @@ pub fn call(globalObject: *jsc.JSGlobalObject, callframe: *jsc.CallFrame) bun.JS
break :brk b.allocatedSlice();
};
// Reject null bytes in connection parameters to prevent Postgres startup
// message parameter injection (null bytes act as field terminators in the
// wire protocol's key\0value\0 format).
inline for (.{ .{ username, "username" }, .{ password, "password" }, .{ database, "database" }, .{ path, "path" } }) |entry| {
if (entry[0].len > 0 and std.mem.indexOfScalar(u8, entry[0], 0) != null) {
bun.default_allocator.free(options_buf);
tls_config.deinit();
if (tls_ctx) |tls| {
tls.deinit(true);
}
return globalObject.throwInvalidArguments(entry[1] ++ " must not contain null bytes", .{});
}
}
const on_connect = arguments[9];
const on_close = arguments[10];
const idle_timeout = arguments[11].toInt32();
@@ -1626,7 +1640,10 @@ pub fn on(this: *PostgresSQLConnection, comptime MessageType: @Type(.enum_litera
// This will usually start with "v="
const comparison_signature = final.data.slice();
if (comparison_signature.len < 2 or !bun.strings.eqlLong(server_signature, comparison_signature[2..], true)) {
if (comparison_signature.len < 2 or
server_signature.len != comparison_signature.len - 2 or
BoringSSL.c.CRYPTO_memcmp(server_signature.ptr, comparison_signature[2..].ptr, server_signature.len) != 0)
{
debug("SASLFinal - SASL Server signature mismatch\nExpected: {s}\nActual: {s}", .{ server_signature, comparison_signature[2..] });
this.fail("The server did not return the correct signature", error.SASL_SIGNATURE_MISMATCH);
} else {

View File

@@ -260,14 +260,35 @@ devTest("hmr handles rapid consecutive edits", {
await Bun.sleep(1);
}
// Wait event-driven for "render 10" to appear. Intermediate renders may
// be skipped (watcher coalescing) and the final render may fire multiple
// times (duplicate reloads), so we just listen for any occurrence.
const finalRender = "render 10";
while (true) {
const message = await client.getStringMessage();
if (message === finalRender) break;
if (typeof message === "string" && message.includes("HMR_ERROR")) {
throw new Error("Unexpected HMR error message: " + message);
}
}
await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
const check = () => {
for (const msg of client.messages) {
if (typeof msg === "string" && msg.includes("HMR_ERROR")) {
cleanup();
reject(new Error("Unexpected HMR error message: " + msg));
return;
}
if (msg === finalRender) {
cleanup();
resolve();
return;
}
}
};
const cleanup = () => {
client.off("message", check);
};
client.on("message", check);
// Check messages already buffered.
check();
});
// Drain all buffered messages — intermediate renders and possible
// duplicates of the final render are expected and harmless.
client.messages.length = 0;
const hmrErrors = await client.js`return globalThis.__hmrErrors ? [...globalThis.__hmrErrors] : [];`;
if (hmrErrors.length > 0) {

View File

@@ -611,6 +611,82 @@ describe("Bun.Archive", () => {
// Very deep paths might fail on some systems - that's acceptable
}
});
test("directory entries with path traversal components cannot escape extraction root", async () => {
// Manually craft a tar archive containing directory entries with "../" traversal
// components in their pathnames. This tests that the extraction code uses the
// normalized path (which strips "..") rather than the raw pathname from the tarball.
function createTarHeader(
name: string,
size: number,
type: "0" | "5", // 0=file, 5=directory
): Uint8Array {
const header = new Uint8Array(512);
const enc = new TextEncoder();
header.set(enc.encode(name).slice(0, 100), 0);
header.set(enc.encode(type === "5" ? "0000755 " : "0000644 "), 100);
header.set(enc.encode("0000000 "), 108);
header.set(enc.encode("0000000 "), 116);
header.set(enc.encode(size.toString(8).padStart(11, "0") + " "), 124);
const mtime = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
.toString(8)
.padStart(11, "0");
header.set(enc.encode(mtime + " "), 136);
header.set(enc.encode(" "), 148); // checksum placeholder
header[156] = type.charCodeAt(0);
header.set(enc.encode("ustar"), 257);
header[262] = 0;
header.set(enc.encode("00"), 263);
let checksum = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < 512; i++) checksum += header[i];
header.set(enc.encode(checksum.toString(8).padStart(6, "0") + "\0 "), 148);
return header;
}
const blocks: Uint8Array[] = [];
const enc = new TextEncoder();
// A legitimate directory
blocks.push(createTarHeader("safe_dir/", 0, "5"));
// A directory entry with traversal: "safe_dir/../../escaped_dir/"
// After normalization this becomes "escaped_dir" (safe),
// but the raw pathname resolves ".." via the kernel in mkdirat.
blocks.push(createTarHeader("safe_dir/../../escaped_dir/", 0, "5"));
// A normal file
const content = enc.encode("hello");
blocks.push(createTarHeader("safe_dir/file.txt", content.length, "0"));
blocks.push(content);
const pad = 512 - (content.length % 512);
if (pad < 512) blocks.push(new Uint8Array(pad));
// End-of-archive markers
blocks.push(new Uint8Array(1024));
const totalLen = blocks.reduce((s, b) => s + b.length, 0);
const tarball = new Uint8Array(totalLen);
let offset = 0;
for (const b of blocks) {
tarball.set(b, offset);
offset += b.length;
}
// Create a parent directory so we can check if "escaped_dir" appears outside extractDir
using parentDir = tempDir("archive-traversal-parent", {});
const extractPath = join(String(parentDir), "extract");
const { mkdirSync, existsSync } = require("fs");
mkdirSync(extractPath, { recursive: true });
const archive = new Bun.Archive(tarball);
await archive.extract(extractPath);
// The "escaped_dir" should NOT exist in the parent directory (outside extraction root)
const escapedOutside = join(String(parentDir), "escaped_dir");
expect(existsSync(escapedOutside)).toBe(false);
// The "safe_dir" should exist inside the extraction directory
expect(existsSync(join(extractPath, "safe_dir"))).toBe(true);
// The normalized "escaped_dir" may or may not exist inside extractPath
// (depending on whether normalization keeps it), but it must NOT be outside
});
});
describe("Archive.write()", () => {

View File

@@ -489,6 +489,61 @@ brr = 3
"zr": ["deedee"],
});
});
describe("truncated/invalid utf-8", () => {
test("bare continuation byte (0x80) should not crash", () => {
// 0x80 is a continuation byte without a leading byte
// utf8ByteSequenceLength returns 0, which must not hit unreachable
const ini = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from("key = "), Buffer.from([0x80])]).toString("latin1");
// Should not crash - just parse gracefully
expect(() => parse(ini)).not.toThrow();
});
test("truncated 2-byte sequence at end of value", () => {
// 0xC0 is a 2-byte lead byte, but there's no continuation byte following
const ini = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from("key = "), Buffer.from([0xc0])]).toString("latin1");
expect(() => parse(ini)).not.toThrow();
});
test("truncated 3-byte sequence at end of value", () => {
// 0xE0 is a 3-byte lead byte, but only 0 continuation bytes follow
const ini = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from("key = "), Buffer.from([0xe0])]).toString("latin1");
expect(() => parse(ini)).not.toThrow();
});
test("truncated 3-byte sequence with 1 continuation byte at end", () => {
// 0xE0 is a 3-byte lead byte, but only 1 continuation byte follows
const ini = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from("key = "), Buffer.from([0xe0, 0x80])]).toString("latin1");
expect(() => parse(ini)).not.toThrow();
});
test("truncated 4-byte sequence at end of value", () => {
// 0xF0 is a 4-byte lead byte, but only 0 continuation bytes follow
const ini = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from("key = "), Buffer.from([0xf0])]).toString("latin1");
expect(() => parse(ini)).not.toThrow();
});
test("truncated 4-byte sequence with 1 continuation byte at end", () => {
const ini = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from("key = "), Buffer.from([0xf0, 0x80])]).toString("latin1");
expect(() => parse(ini)).not.toThrow();
});
test("truncated 4-byte sequence with 2 continuation bytes at end", () => {
const ini = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from("key = "), Buffer.from([0xf0, 0x80, 0x80])]).toString("latin1");
expect(() => parse(ini)).not.toThrow();
});
test("truncated 2-byte sequence in escaped context", () => {
// Backslash followed by a 2-byte lead byte at end of value
const ini = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from("key = \\"), Buffer.from([0xc0])]).toString("latin1");
expect(() => parse(ini)).not.toThrow();
});
test("bare continuation byte in escaped context", () => {
const ini = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from("key = \\"), Buffer.from([0x80])]).toString("latin1");
expect(() => parse(ini)).not.toThrow();
});
});
});
const wtf = {

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
import { bunEnv, bunExe, isPosix } from "harness";
// Regression test: cd with a path component exceeding NAME_MAX (255 bytes)
// triggers ENAMETOOLONG from openat(). The handleChangeCwdErr function
// had `else => return .failed` which means "JS error was thrown" but
// no error was actually thrown, causing the shell to hang indefinitely.
describe.if(isPosix)("cd with path exceeding NAME_MAX should not hang", () => {
test("cd returns error for path component > 255 chars", async () => {
const longComponent = Buffer.alloc(256, "A").toString();
await using proc = Bun.spawn({
cmd: [
bunExe(),
"-e",
`
import { $ } from "bun";
$.throws(false);
const r = await $\`cd ${longComponent}\`;
console.log("exitCode:" + r.exitCode);
`,
],
env: { ...bunEnv, longComponent },
stderr: "pipe",
stdout: "pipe",
});
const [stdout, stderr, exitCode] = await Promise.all([proc.stdout.text(), proc.stderr.text(), proc.exited]);
expect(stdout).toContain("exitCode:1");
expect(stderr).toContain("File name too long");
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
import { TCPSocketListener } from "bun";
import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
const hostname = "127.0.0.1";
const MAX_HEADER_SIZE = 16 * 1024;
function doHandshake(
socket: any,
handshakeBuffer: Uint8Array,
data: Uint8Array,
): { buffer: Uint8Array; done: boolean } {
const newBuffer = new Uint8Array(handshakeBuffer.length + data.length);
newBuffer.set(handshakeBuffer);
newBuffer.set(data, handshakeBuffer.length);
if (newBuffer.length > MAX_HEADER_SIZE) {
socket.end();
throw new Error("Handshake headers too large");
}
const dataStr = new TextDecoder("utf-8").decode(newBuffer);
const endOfHeaders = dataStr.indexOf("\r\n\r\n");
if (endOfHeaders === -1) {
return { buffer: newBuffer, done: false };
}
if (!dataStr.startsWith("GET")) {
throw new Error("Invalid handshake");
}
const magic = /Sec-WebSocket-Key:\s*(.*)\r\n/i.exec(dataStr);
if (!magic) {
throw new Error("Missing Sec-WebSocket-Key");
}
const hasher = new Bun.CryptoHasher("sha1");
hasher.update(magic[1].trim());
hasher.update("258EAFA5-E914-47DA-95CA-C5AB0DC85B11");
const accept = hasher.digest("base64");
socket.write(
"HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\n" +
"Upgrade: websocket\r\n" +
"Connection: Upgrade\r\n" +
`Sec-WebSocket-Accept: ${accept}\r\n` +
"\r\n",
);
socket.flush();
return { buffer: newBuffer, done: true };
}
function makeTextFrame(text: string): Uint8Array {
const payload = new TextEncoder().encode(text);
const len = payload.length;
let header: Uint8Array;
if (len < 126) {
header = new Uint8Array([0x81, len]);
} else if (len < 65536) {
header = new Uint8Array([0x81, 126, (len >> 8) & 0xff, len & 0xff]);
} else {
throw new Error("Message too large for this test");
}
const frame = new Uint8Array(header.length + len);
frame.set(header);
frame.set(payload, header.length);
return frame;
}
describe("WebSocket", () => {
test("fragmented pong frame does not cause frame desync", async () => {
let server: TCPSocketListener | undefined;
let client: WebSocket | undefined;
let handshakeBuffer = new Uint8Array(0);
let handshakeComplete = false;
try {
const { promise, resolve, reject } = Promise.withResolvers<void>();
server = Bun.listen({
socket: {
data(socket, data) {
if (handshakeComplete) {
// After handshake, we just receive client frames (like close) - ignore them
return;
}
const result = doHandshake(socket, handshakeBuffer, new Uint8Array(data));
handshakeBuffer = result.buffer;
if (!result.done) return;
handshakeComplete = true;
// Build a pong frame with a 50-byte payload, but deliver it in two parts.
// Pong opcode = 0x8A, FIN=1
const pongPayload = new Uint8Array(50);
for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) pongPayload[i] = 0x41 + (i % 26); // 'A'-'Z' repeated
const pongFrame = new Uint8Array(2 + 50);
pongFrame[0] = 0x8a; // FIN + Pong opcode
pongFrame[1] = 50; // payload length
pongFrame.set(pongPayload, 2);
// Part 1 of pong: header (2 bytes) + first 2 bytes of payload = 4 bytes
// This leaves 48 bytes of pong payload undelivered.
const pongPart1 = pongFrame.slice(0, 4);
// Part 2: remaining 48 bytes of pong payload
const pongPart2 = pongFrame.slice(4);
// A text message to send after the pong completes.
const textFrame = makeTextFrame("hello after pong");
// Send part 1 of pong
socket.write(pongPart1);
socket.flush();
// After a delay, send part 2 of pong + the follow-up text message
setTimeout(() => {
// Concatenate part2 + text frame to simulate them arriving together
const combined = new Uint8Array(pongPart2.length + textFrame.length);
combined.set(pongPart2);
combined.set(textFrame, pongPart2.length);
socket.write(combined);
socket.flush();
}, 50);
},
},
hostname,
port: 0,
});
const messages: string[] = [];
client = new WebSocket(`ws://${server.hostname}:${server.port}`);
client.addEventListener("error", event => {
reject(new Error("WebSocket error"));
});
client.addEventListener("close", event => {
// If the connection closes unexpectedly due to frame desync, the test should fail
reject(new Error(`WebSocket closed unexpectedly: code=${event.code} reason=${event.reason}`));
});
client.addEventListener("message", event => {
messages.push(event.data as string);
if (messages.length === 1) {
// We got the text message after the fragmented pong
try {
expect(messages[0]).toBe("hello after pong");
resolve();
} catch (err) {
reject(err);
}
}
});
await promise;
} finally {
client?.close();
server?.stop(true);
}
});
test("pong frame with payload > 125 bytes is rejected", async () => {
let server: TCPSocketListener | undefined;
let client: WebSocket | undefined;
let handshakeBuffer = new Uint8Array(0);
let handshakeComplete = false;
try {
const { promise, resolve, reject } = Promise.withResolvers<void>();
server = Bun.listen({
socket: {
data(socket, data) {
if (handshakeComplete) return;
const result = doHandshake(socket, handshakeBuffer, new Uint8Array(data));
handshakeBuffer = result.buffer;
if (!result.done) return;
handshakeComplete = true;
// Send a pong frame with a 126-byte payload (invalid per RFC 6455 Section 5.5)
// Control frames MUST have a payload length of 125 bytes or less.
// Use 2-byte extended length encoding since 126 > 125.
// But actually, the 7-bit length field in byte[1] can encode 0-125 directly.
// For 126, the server must use the extended 16-bit length.
// However, control frames with >125 payload are invalid regardless of encoding.
const pongFrame = new Uint8Array(4 + 126);
pongFrame[0] = 0x8a; // FIN + Pong
pongFrame[1] = 126; // Signals 16-bit extended length follows
pongFrame[2] = 0; // High byte of length
pongFrame[3] = 126; // Low byte of length = 126
// Fill payload with arbitrary data
for (let i = 0; i < 126; i++) pongFrame[4 + i] = 0x42;
socket.write(pongFrame);
socket.flush();
},
},
hostname,
port: 0,
});
client = new WebSocket(`ws://${server.hostname}:${server.port}`);
client.addEventListener("error", () => {
// Expected - the connection should error due to invalid control frame
resolve();
});
client.addEventListener("close", () => {
// Also acceptable - connection closes due to protocol error
resolve();
});
client.addEventListener("message", () => {
reject(new Error("Should not receive a message from an invalid pong frame"));
});
await promise;
} finally {
client?.close();
server?.stop(true);
}
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
import { expect, test } from "bun:test";
import { bunEnv, bunExe, tempDir } from "harness";
import { join } from "path";
test("--bail writes JUnit reporter outfile", async () => {
using dir = tempDir("bail-junit", {
"fail.test.ts": `
import { test, expect } from "bun:test";
test("failing test", () => { expect(1).toBe(2); });
`,
});
const outfile = join(String(dir), "results.xml");
await using proc = Bun.spawn({
cmd: [bunExe(), "test", "--bail", "--reporter=junit", `--reporter-outfile=${outfile}`, "fail.test.ts"],
env: bunEnv,
cwd: String(dir),
stdout: "pipe",
stderr: "pipe",
});
const exitCode = await proc.exited;
// The test should fail and bail
expect(exitCode).not.toBe(0);
// The JUnit report file should still be written despite bail
const file = Bun.file(outfile);
expect(await file.exists()).toBe(true);
const xml = await file.text();
expect(xml).toContain("<?xml");
expect(xml).toContain("<testsuites");
expect(xml).toContain("</testsuites>");
expect(xml).toContain("failing test");
});
test("--bail writes JUnit reporter outfile with multiple files", async () => {
using dir = tempDir("bail-junit-multi", {
"a_pass.test.ts": `
import { test, expect } from "bun:test";
test("passing test", () => { expect(1).toBe(1); });
`,
"b_fail.test.ts": `
import { test, expect } from "bun:test";
test("another failing test", () => { expect(1).toBe(2); });
`,
});
const outfile = join(String(dir), "results.xml");
await using proc = Bun.spawn({
cmd: [bunExe(), "test", "--bail", "--reporter=junit", `--reporter-outfile=${outfile}`],
env: bunEnv,
cwd: String(dir),
stdout: "pipe",
stderr: "pipe",
});
const exitCode = await proc.exited;
// The test should fail and bail
expect(exitCode).not.toBe(0);
// The JUnit report file should still be written despite bail
const file = Bun.file(outfile);
expect(await file.exists()).toBe(true);
const xml = await file.text();
expect(xml).toContain("<?xml");
expect(xml).toContain("<testsuites");
expect(xml).toContain("</testsuites>");
// Both the passing and failing tests should be recorded
expect(xml).toContain("passing test");
expect(xml).toContain("another failing test");
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
import { SQL } from "bun";
import { expect, test } from "bun:test";
import net from "net";
test("postgres connection rejects null bytes in username", async () => {
let serverReceivedData = false;
const server = net.createServer(socket => {
serverReceivedData = true;
socket.destroy();
});
await new Promise<void>(r => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => r()));
const port = (server.address() as net.AddressInfo).port;
try {
const sql = new SQL({
hostname: "127.0.0.1",
port,
username: "alice\x00search_path\x00evil_schema,public",
database: "testdb",
max: 1,
idleTimeout: 1,
connectionTimeout: 2,
});
await sql`SELECT 1`;
expect.unreachable();
} catch (e: any) {
expect(e.message).toContain("null bytes");
} finally {
server.close();
}
// The server should never have received any data because the null byte
// should be rejected before the connection is established.
expect(serverReceivedData).toBe(false);
});
test("postgres connection rejects null bytes in database", async () => {
let serverReceivedData = false;
const server = net.createServer(socket => {
serverReceivedData = true;
socket.destroy();
});
await new Promise<void>(r => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => r()));
const port = (server.address() as net.AddressInfo).port;
try {
const sql = new SQL({
hostname: "127.0.0.1",
port,
username: "alice",
database: "testdb\x00search_path\x00evil_schema,public",
max: 1,
idleTimeout: 1,
connectionTimeout: 2,
});
await sql`SELECT 1`;
expect.unreachable();
} catch (e: any) {
expect(e.message).toContain("null bytes");
} finally {
server.close();
}
expect(serverReceivedData).toBe(false);
});
test("postgres connection rejects null bytes in password", async () => {
let serverReceivedData = false;
const server = net.createServer(socket => {
serverReceivedData = true;
socket.destroy();
});
await new Promise<void>(r => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => r()));
const port = (server.address() as net.AddressInfo).port;
try {
const sql = new SQL({
hostname: "127.0.0.1",
port,
username: "alice",
password: "pass\x00search_path\x00evil_schema",
database: "testdb",
max: 1,
idleTimeout: 1,
connectionTimeout: 2,
});
await sql`SELECT 1`;
expect.unreachable();
} catch (e: any) {
expect(e.message).toContain("null bytes");
} finally {
server.close();
}
expect(serverReceivedData).toBe(false);
});
test("postgres connection does not use truncated path with null bytes", async () => {
// The JS layer's fs.existsSync() rejects paths containing null bytes,
// so the path is dropped before reaching the native layer. Verify that a
// path with null bytes doesn't silently connect via a truncated path.
let serverReceivedData = false;
const server = net.createServer(socket => {
serverReceivedData = true;
socket.destroy();
});
await new Promise<void>(r => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => r()));
const port = (server.address() as net.AddressInfo).port;
try {
const sql = new SQL({
hostname: "127.0.0.1",
port,
username: "alice",
database: "testdb",
path: "/tmp\x00injected",
max: 1,
idleTimeout: 1,
connectionTimeout: 2,
});
await sql`SELECT 1`;
} catch {
// Expected to fail
} finally {
server.close();
}
// The path had null bytes so it should have been dropped by the JS layer,
// falling back to TCP where it hits our mock server (not a truncated Unix socket).
expect(serverReceivedData).toBe(true);
});
test("postgres connection works with normal parameters (no null bytes)", async () => {
// Verify that normal connections without null bytes still work.
// Use a mock server that sends an auth error so we can verify the
// startup message is sent correctly.
let receivedData = false;
const server = net.createServer(socket => {
socket.once("data", () => {
receivedData = true;
const errMsg = Buffer.from("SFATAL\0VFATAL\0C28000\0Mauthentication failed\0\0");
const len = errMsg.length + 4;
const header = Buffer.alloc(5);
header.write("E", 0);
header.writeInt32BE(len, 1);
socket.write(Buffer.concat([header, errMsg]));
socket.destroy();
});
});
await new Promise<void>(r => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => r()));
const port = (server.address() as net.AddressInfo).port;
try {
const sql = new SQL({
hostname: "127.0.0.1",
port,
username: "alice",
database: "testdb",
max: 1,
idleTimeout: 1,
connectionTimeout: 2,
});
await sql`SELECT 1`;
} catch {
// Expected - mock server sends auth error
} finally {
server.close();
}
// Normal parameters should connect fine - the server should receive data
expect(receivedData).toBe(true);
});

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import { S3Client } from "bun";
import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
// Test that CRLF characters in S3 options are rejected to prevent header injection.
// See: HTTP Header Injection via S3 Content-Disposition Value
describe("S3 header injection prevention", () => {
test("contentDisposition with CRLF should throw", () => {
using server = Bun.serve({
port: 0,
fetch() {
return new Response("OK", { status: 200 });
},
});
const client = new S3Client({
accessKeyId: "test-key",
secretAccessKey: "test-secret",
endpoint: server.url.href,
bucket: "test-bucket",
});
expect(() =>
client.write("test-file.txt", "Hello", {
contentDisposition: 'attachment; filename="evil"\r\nX-Injected: value',
}),
).toThrow(/CR\/LF/);
});
test("contentEncoding with CRLF should throw", () => {
using server = Bun.serve({
port: 0,
fetch() {
return new Response("OK", { status: 200 });
},
});
const client = new S3Client({
accessKeyId: "test-key",
secretAccessKey: "test-secret",
endpoint: server.url.href,
bucket: "test-bucket",
});
expect(() =>
client.write("test-file.txt", "Hello", {
contentEncoding: "gzip\r\nX-Injected: value",
}),
).toThrow(/CR\/LF/);
});
test("type (content-type) with CRLF should throw", () => {
using server = Bun.serve({
port: 0,
fetch() {
return new Response("OK", { status: 200 });
},
});
const client = new S3Client({
accessKeyId: "test-key",
secretAccessKey: "test-secret",
endpoint: server.url.href,
bucket: "test-bucket",
});
expect(() =>
client.write("test-file.txt", "Hello", {
type: "text/plain\r\nX-Injected: value",
}),
).toThrow(/CR\/LF/);
});
test("contentDisposition with only CR should throw", () => {
using server = Bun.serve({
port: 0,
fetch() {
return new Response("OK", { status: 200 });
},
});
const client = new S3Client({
accessKeyId: "test-key",
secretAccessKey: "test-secret",
endpoint: server.url.href,
bucket: "test-bucket",
});
expect(() =>
client.write("test-file.txt", "Hello", {
contentDisposition: "attachment\rinjected",
}),
).toThrow(/CR\/LF/);
});
test("contentDisposition with only LF should throw", () => {
using server = Bun.serve({
port: 0,
fetch() {
return new Response("OK", { status: 200 });
},
});
const client = new S3Client({
accessKeyId: "test-key",
secretAccessKey: "test-secret",
endpoint: server.url.href,
bucket: "test-bucket",
});
expect(() =>
client.write("test-file.txt", "Hello", {
contentDisposition: "attachment\ninjected",
}),
).toThrow(/CR\/LF/);
});
test("valid contentDisposition without CRLF should not throw", async () => {
const { promise: requestReceived, resolve: onRequestReceived } = Promise.withResolvers<Headers>();
using server = Bun.serve({
port: 0,
async fetch(req) {
onRequestReceived(req.headers);
return new Response("OK", { status: 200 });
},
});
const client = new S3Client({
accessKeyId: "test-key",
secretAccessKey: "test-secret",
endpoint: server.url.href,
bucket: "test-bucket",
});
// Valid content-disposition values should not throw synchronously.
// The write may eventually fail because the mock server doesn't speak S3 protocol,
// but the option parsing should succeed and a request should be initiated.
expect(() =>
client.write("test-file.txt", "Hello", {
contentDisposition: 'attachment; filename="report.pdf"',
}),
).not.toThrow();
const receivedHeaders = await requestReceived;
expect(receivedHeaders.get("content-disposition")).toBe('attachment; filename="report.pdf"');
});
});